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Abstract	
Presented	within	this	article	is	a	systematic	discourse	analysis	of	the	arguments	used	by	the	
then	Australian	Prime	Minister	and	also	the	Minister	for	Indigenous	Affairs	in	explaining	and	
justifying	the	extensive	and	contentious	intervention	by	the	federal	government	into	remote	
Northern	Territory	Aboriginal	communities.	The	methods	used	within	this	article	extend	the	
socio‐legal	toolbox,	providing	a	contextually	appropriate,	interdisciplinary	methodology	that	
analyses	the	speech	act’s	rhetorical	properties.	Although	many	academics	use	sound‐bites	of	
pre‐legislative	 speech	 in	 order	 to	 support	 their	 claims,	 this	 analysis	 is	 concerned	 with	
investigating	the	contents	of	the	speech	acts	in	order	to	understand	how	the	Prime	Minister’s	
and	Minister	for	Indigenous	Affairs’	argumentations	sought	to	achieve	consensus	to	facilitate	
the	 enactment	 of	 legislation.	 Those	 seeking	 to	 understand	 legislative	 endeavours,	 policy	
makers	 and	 speech	 actors	 will	 find	 that	 paying	 structured	 attention	 to	 the	 rhetorical	
properties	of	speech	acts	yields	opportunities	to	strengthen	their	insight.	The	analysis	here	
indicates	 three	 features	 in	 the	 argumentation:	 the	 duality	 in	 the	 Prime	 Minister’s	 and	
Minister’s	use	of	the	Northern	Territory	Government’s	Little	Children	are	Sacred	report;	the	
failure	 to	 sufficiently	 detail	 the	 linkages	 between	 the	 Intervention	 and	 the	 measures	
combatting	 child	 sexual	 abuse;	 and	 the	 omission	 of	 recognition	 of	 Aboriginal	 agency	 and	
consultation.	
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Introduction	
How	did	 an	Australian	 federal	 administration	 justify	 legislation	 facilitating	 an	 unprecedented	
intervention	 into	 remote	 Aboriginal1	 communities	 after	 years	 of	 inaction?	 In	 May	 2006,	 the	
Australian	 Broadcasting	 Corporation’s	 popular	 Lateline	 national	 television	 program	 aired	 an	
interview	with	Nanette	Rogers,	the	Crown	Prosecutor	for	the	Northern	Territory	(Jones	2006).	
This	 program	 catapulted	 the	 long‐standing	 issues	 of	 Aboriginal	 community	 degradation	 and	
reporting	 of	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 onto	 an	 international	 stage	 (see	 Mercer	 2006).	 The	 federal	
government,	 through	 the	 Council	 of	 Australian	 Governments	 (COAG),	 convened	 the	
Intergovernmental	 Summit	 on	 Violence	 and	 Child	 Abuse	 in	 Indigenous	 Communities.	
Recognising	 that	 these	 issues	 existed	 for	 Indigenous	 communities	 throughout	 Australia	 in	
urban,	rural	and	remote	areas,	COAG	expressed	concern	that:	
	
…	 some	 Indigenous	 communities	 suffer	 from	high	 levels	 of	 family	 violence	 and	
child	abuse.	Leaders	agreed	that	this	is	unacceptable.	Its	magnitude	demands	an	
immediate	 national	 targeted	 response	 focused	 on	 improving	 the	 safety	 of	
Indigenous	Australians.	Despite	 all	 jurisdictions	 having	 taken	 steps	over	 recent	
years	to	address	this	problem,	 improved	resourcing	and	a	concerted,	 long‐term	
joint	effort	are	essential	to	achieve	significant	change.	(COAG	2006:	12)		
	
In	 response,	 the	 federal	 government	 offered	 to	 provide	 AU$130	 million	 in	 order	 to	 combat	
issues	 in	 remote	 communities;	 AU$40	 million	 of	 which	 was	 earmarked	 for	 increased	 police	
resources.	 Faced	 with	 Rogers’	 allegations	 and	 increasing	 pressure	 from	 the	 federal	
government’s	 Minister	 for	 Families	 and	 Community	 Services	 and	 Indigenous	 Affairs,	 Mal	
Brough,	 the	Northern	Territory	Chief	Minister	 Clare	Martin	 commissioned	 a	 report	 into	 child	
sexual	abuse	in	the	Northern	Territory.		
	
The	 report,	 Little	 Children	 are	 Sacred	 (Wild	 and	 Anderson	 2007;	 hereafter	 ‘the	 Report’)	 was	
delivered	to	Northern	Territory	Chief	Minister	Martin	on	30	April	2007	and	released	publicly	on	
15	June	2007.	From	the	time	of	his	appointment	to	the	federal	cabinet	in	January	2006,	Minister	
Brough	had	indicated	a	willingness	to	respond	to	the	increasing	levels	of	concern	in	Indigenous	
communities.	On	the	same	day	as	the	Report	was	released,	Brough	signalled:	
	
…	 [c]ommit[tment]	 to	 working	 with	 the	 Northern	 Territory	 Government	 to	 do	
whatever	is	necessary	to	bring	an	end	to	this	insidious	behaviour	in	Indigenous	
communities.	(Brough:	Speech	Act	A)	
	
The	result	was	the	Northern	Territory	National	Emergency	Response.	Over	500	pages	of	hastily	
designed	and	inherently	complex	legislation	to	tackle	the	systemic	problems	surrounding	child	
abuse	in	the	Northern	Territory’s	Indigenous	communities	were	introduced	into	Parliament	on	
7	August	2007	in	three	main	bills.	These	were	passed	expeditiously	in	the	Senate,	as	noted	by	
both	 Pritchard	 (2007)	 and	 Edmunds	 (2010),	 in	 order	 to	 receive	 Royal	 Assent	 by	 17	 August	
2007.	The	legislated	acts,	the	contents	of	which	are	detailed	extensively	elsewhere	(see	Billings	
2009;	Cripps	2007),	contained	a	range	of	provisions:	on	access	to	and	consumption	of	alcohol;	
on	 pornography	 on	 publicly‐funded	 computers;	 on	 possession	 and	 distribution	 of	 prohibited	
material	 such	 as	 pornography	 and	 films	 classified	 as	 X	 18+	 or	 publication,	 film	 or	 computer	
game	classified	as	RC;	on	acquisition	of	rights,	titles	and	land	interests;	on	access	to	Aboriginal	
land;	 on	 law	 enforcement,	 bail	 and	 sentencing;	 on	 licensing	 of	 community	 stores;	 and	 on	
implementation	 of	 an	 income	management	 regime.	 Controversially,	 the	 legislation	 contained	
provisions	 suspending	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 Commonwealth’s	Racial	Discrimination	Act	 1975,	
preventing	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 legislation	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 it	 was	 targeting	 a	 racially	 distinct	
group.	 Forthwith	 in	 this	 article,	 ’the	 Intervention’	 will	 refer	 to	 the	 package	 of	 legislative	
measures	enacted	following	Minister	Brough’s	announced	intention	of	the	federal	government	
to	intercede.2		
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The	 provisions	were	 extensive	 and	 highly	 intrusive,	 significantly	 impacting	 the	 lives	 of	 those	
subject	 to	 them.	 They	 applied	 to	 entire	 Aboriginal	 communities:	 merely	 by	 living	 within	 a	
designated	community,	individuals	and	families	were	subject	to	the	legislation.	Understandably,	
many	Australians,	 both	 Indigenous	and	non‐Indigenous,	have	been	overwhelmingly	 critical	 of	
the	 need	 to	 intervene,	 the	 method	 or	 tools	 of	 the	 used,	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 action	 taken.	
Examples	include	Howe’s	assessment	that	the	administration	was	‘reactionary…	[and]	with	such	
an	appalling	track	record	on	Indigenous	affairs’	(Howe	2009:	42).	Willis	similarly	suggested	the	
foray	was	an	‘unnecessarily	violent	and	biased	reaction	to	a	genuine	problem’	(Willis	2012:	90);	
while	the	then	Australian	Prime	Minister	John	Howard	was	called	a	‘racist	bastard’	by	the	New	
Zealand	Maori	activist	and	former	parliamentarian	Hone	Harawira	(cited	in	Small,	Murdoch	and	
Coorey	2007).	Stringer	categorised	the	federal	government’s	decision	to	act	as	‘neocolonial	and	
its	 actual	 agenda	 as	 one	 of	 assimilatory	 neoliberalism’	 (2007:	 1).	 Others	 have	 suggested	 the	
response	was	‘disproportionate	and	extreme’	(Tedmanson	and	Wadiwel	2010:	11)	and	a	case	of	
‘sheer	 political	 opportunism	 to	 advance	 an	 already	 in‐motion	 agenda	 [to	 move	 Aboriginal	
people	off	their	lands],	and	to	score	points	in	an	election	year’	(Martiniello	2007:	124).	
	
Scope	of	this	article	
This	article	presents	the	results	of	a	systematic	discourse	analysis	of	16	public	speech	acts3	by	
the	then	Prime	Minister,	John	Howard,	and	then	Minister	for	Families	and	Community	Services	
and	Indigenous	Affairs,	Mal	Brough,	(collectively,	‘the	Ministers’)	which	were	used	to	justify	the	
legislative	provisions	of	the	Intervention.	
	
Socio‐legal	analysis	takes	many	forms	but	has	to	date	shied	away	from	engaging	with	significant	
structured	analysis	of	 communication	 and	argument	 in	 the	pre‐legislative	process.	 Like	much	
legal	 analysis,	 socio‐legal	 analysis	 has	 avoided	 paying	 substantial	 attention	 to	 the	
argumentation	of	politicians,	leaving	this	to	be	analysed	within	the	political	sphere.	Bucking	this	
trend,	this	article	highlights	how	an	appropriate	discursive	methodology	can	be	used	to	expand	
our	 knowledge	 of	 the	 use	 and	manipulation	 of	 language	within	 the	 pre‐legislative	 process.	 It	
facilitates	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 argumentation	 supporting	 legislation	 intervening	 into	
Aboriginal	communities.	It	paves	the	way	for	further	research	into	strategies	for	argumentation	
for	 facilitating	 legislative	 enactment	 and,	 in	 this	 instance,	 it	 also	 provides	 an	 empirical	
understanding	 of	 how	 key	 features	 such	 as	 the	 emergency	 nature	 of	 the	 Intervention	 were	
deployed	 to	aid	 the	Ministers’	 argument.	The	 findings	provide	a	platform	for	 further	research	
into	the	effectiveness	of	the	legislation	in	ameliorating	the	situation	and	its	impact	on	Aboriginal	
communities.	Conducting	the	research	within	an	inductive	paradigm	leads	to	empirical	findings	
that	can	be	used	to	support	alternative	truths;	although	outside	the	scope	of	this	article,	these	
relate	 in	particular	to	the	basis	and	motivations	for	Ministerial	 intervention	and	later	shifts	 in	
Ministerial	discourse	on	the	Intervention,	including	inclusivity	surrounding	the	Stronger	Futures	
in	 the	 Northern	 Territory	 Act	 2012	 (Cth).	 Such	 analysis	 can	 be	 useful	 for	 policy	 makers,	
politicians	and	orators	using	rhetorical	techniques,	and	those	seeking	to	critique	them.		
	
The	 article	 outlines	 the	 need	 for	 a	 socio‐legal	 analysis,	 the	 socio‐legal	 framework	 and	
methodology	 used.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 speech	 acts	 identified	 three	 key	 features	 within	 the	
Ministers’	argumentation.	These	relate	to	the	duality	in	the	Ministers’	use	of	the	Little	Children	
are	 Sacred	 report;	 the	 explanation	 of	 linkages	 between	 the	 legislative	 provisions	 of	 the	
Intervention	and	combating	child	sexual	abuse;	and	the	Ministers	absence	of	any	recognition	of	
Aboriginal	 agency	 and	 the	 need	 for	 consultation.	 These	 features	 in	 the	 argumentation	 are	
discussed,	before	concluding	comments	are	made.	
	
A	socio‐legal	analysis	of	argumentation	justifying	the	Intervention	
There	have	been	attempts	by	socio‐legal	scholars	to	engage	with	the	pre‐legislative	process.	For	
example,	McManus	(1978:	201)	looked	to	the	pre‐legislative	space	for	an	‘understanding	of	the	
variety	of	ways	 in	which	power	can	manifest	 itself’	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	emergence	and	non‐
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emergence	of	legislation.	McManus	(1978:	201)	has	suggested	that	the	process	of	legislating	is	a	
fascinating	object	of	study	‘because	it	is	the	most	public,	formal,	accountable	and	potent	method	
of	mobilizing	state	power’.	Other	scholarship	offered	by	Hörmann	(1988)	has	sought	to	provide	
research	for	use	by	actors	in	a	political	process.	He	suggested	that	empirical	socio‐legal	studies	
could	 go	 beyond	 their	 principal	 function	 of	 legitimising	 law	 reform	 and	 political	 action	 and	
become	a	 ‘material	 force’	 for	the	political	process	(Hörmann	1988:	211).	Despite	these	forays,	
socio‐legal	scholarship	has	not	expended	much	effort	in	investigating	pre‐legislative	discourse.	
	
While	there	has	been	a	multiplicity	of	research	on	the	Intervention,	very	little	has	examined	the	
discourse	 employed;	 notable	 exceptions	 include	 Proudfoot	 and	 Habibis’s	 (2015)	 analysis	 of	
populist	 media	 accounts,	 and	 Macoun’s	 (2011)	 understanding	 of	 the	 use	 of	 constructions	 of	
Aboriginality	deployed	in	support	of	the	Intervention.	Although	the	Intervention	was	analysed	
by	Grube	(2010)	as	part	of	a	study	on	rhetoric	in	policy	cycles,	there	has	not	been	an	in‐depth	
analysis	of	ministerial	discourse	garnering	support	for	the	legislation	during	the	pre‐legislative	
process.	Other	authors	have	referenced	second	reading	speeches	and	pre‐legislative	discourse	
as	a	means	of	supporting	academic	arguments	about	the	motives,	legitimacy	and	responsivity	of	
government	 action	 towards	 Aboriginal	 people:	 see,	 for	 example,	 Anthony	 (2009),	 Bielefeld	
(2014)	and	Howard‐Wagner	(2010b).	However,	such	analysis	did	not	systematically	analyse	the	
words	 uttered	 in	 a	 methodical	 manner	 within	 an	 inductive	 paradigm.	 In	 comparison,	 this	
analysis	 seeks	 to	understand	 the	Ministers’	 argumentation	 in	 the	 speech	 acts	 that	 resulted	 in	
successful	legislative	enactment	in	a	highly	controversial	policy	area.	The	knowledge	generated	
for	this	article	results	 from	asking	questions	such	as	 ‘How	did	the	Howard	government	 justify	
their	 legislative	 response	 to	 the	 situation	 in	 the	 Northern	 Territory?’	 and	 ‘What	 rhetorical	
techniques	 were	 used	 in	 the	 communication	 of	 arguments	 to	 the	 public	 and	 in	 legislative	
chambers?’	 While	 the	 legislation	 was	 successfully	 passed	 by	 both	 houses	 of	 the	 federal	
parliament,	 my	 analysis	 indicates	 a	 number	 of	 omissions	 in	 both	 the	 argumentation	 and	
justificatory	reasoning	made	to	the	Australian	public	and	legislators.	
	
The	actors	in	the	speech	acts	(see	Table	1)	intended	the	acts’	dissemination	either	in	Parliament	
or	 through	media	 reporting	 as	 part	 of	 the	 public	 debate.	 The	 speeches	were	 located	 using	 a	
search	of	Australian	government	websites.	The	speech	acts	were	delivered	as	part	of	 the	pre‐
legislative	process	between	15	June	2007	and	7	August	2007,	when	the	legislation	was	passed.	
The	analysis	of	the	16	speech	acts	was	conducted	within	the	rhetorical	political	analytical	(RPA)	
paradigm.	 The	 analysis	 was	 inductive	 and	 was	 not	 conducted	 in	 order	 to	 argue	 that	 the	
Intervention	 was	 or	 was	 not	 necessary	 or	 legitimate;	 rather	 it	 sought	 to	 understand	 the	
construction	of	arguments	used	by	the	Ministers	to	enact	legislation.	The	analysis	does	not	start	
with	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 Intervention	 was	 good	 or	 bad,	 necessary	 or	 unnecessary,	
legitimate	 or	 illegitimate.	 Although	 the	 findings	 of	 such	 analysis	 can	 be	 used	 to	 support	
deductive	 research	 that	 may	 argue	 about	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Intervention,	 this	 is	 not	 the	
primary	purpose.		
	
Finlayson	(2004)	argued	that	interpretive	–	that	is,	rhetorical	and	linguistic	–	approaches	have	
not	been	widely	adopted	within	political	science.	Similarly,	they	have	not	been	adopted	in	legal	
scholarship;	black‐letter	legal	scholars	could	attempt	to	write	off	an	analysis	of	such	speech	acts	
as	 simply	 a	 political	 analysis.4	 However,	 the	 pre‐legislative	 process	 is	 a	 perfect	 example	 of	
where	appropriate	interdisciplinary	scholarship	attending	to	differing	needs	is	required;	in	this	
case,	of	politics	and	 law.	The	outcome	of	 the	speech	acts,	as	 intended,	was	a	raft	of	 legislative	
provisions.		
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Table	1:	Summary	of	speech	acts	identified	by	actor(s)	
Id	Code	 Speech	reference	
A	 Media	Release	(15	June	2007)	by	The	Hon	Mal	Brough	MP,	Minister	for	Families,	Community	
Services	and	Indigenous	Affairs	in	the	Australian	federal	parliament,	‘NT	Child	Abuse	
Inquiry’.	
B	 Media	Release	(21	June	2007)	by	The	Hon	Mal	Brough	MP, ‘National	Emergency	Response	to	
Protect	Aboriginal	Children	in	the	NT’.	
C	 Australia,	Commonwealth,	House	of	Representatives	(21	June	2007)	at	72‐76	(The	Hon	Mal	
Brough	MP).	
D	 Interview	(27	June	2007)	of	The	Hon	Mal	Brough	MP	by	Kerry	O'Brien	on	The	7:30	Report,
ABC,	Sydney,	Archives.	
E	 Interview	(7	August	2007)	of	The	Hon	Mal	Brough	MP	by	Alexandra	Kirk	titled	‘Nothing	New	
in	NT	Intervention	Law’	on	AM,	ABC,	Sydney,	Archives.	
F	 The	Hon	John	Howard	MP,	Prime	Minister	of	Australia,	Weekly	Radio	Message	(25	June	
2007).	Available	at	http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15333	(accessed	10	
January	2015).	
G	 Austl.,	Commonwealth,	House	of	Representatives	(7	August	2007)	at 18	(The	Hon	Mal	
Brough	MP).	
H	 Transcript	of	the	Joint	Press	Conference	(21	June	2007)	by	The	Hon	John	Howard	MP	and	
The	Hon	Mal	Brough	MP	on	the	Indigenous	Emergency,	Canberra.	Available	at	
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%
2Fpressrel%2F8XFN6%22	(accessed	10	January	2015).	
I	 Interview	(21	June	2007)	of	The	Hon	John	Howard	MP	by	Tony	Jones	on	Lateline,	ABC,	
Sydney,	Archives.	
J	 Interview	(22	June	2007)	of	The	Hon	John	Howard	MP	by	David	Koch	and	Melissa	Doyle	on	
Sunrise,	7	Network.	Available	at	http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15653	
(accessed	10	January	2015).	
K	 The	Hon	John	Howard	MP	(2007)	‘To	Stabilise	and	Protect:	Little	Children	are	Sacred’.	The	
Sydney	Papers	19(3):	68‐76.	
L	 Interview	(26	June	2007)	of	The	Hon	John	Howard	MP	by	Matt	Conlan	on	Territory	Today,	
Radio	8HA.	Available	at	http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15673	
(accessed	10	January	2015).	
M	 The	Hon	John	Howard	MP	(26	June	2007)	doorstop	interview,	Fraser	Shores,	Hervey	Bay,	
Queensland.	Available	at	http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15672	
(accessed	10	January	2015).	
N	 Joint	Press	Conference	(21	July	2007)	by	The	Hon	John	Howard	MP	and	The	Hon	Mal	Brough
MP	at	Phillip	Street,	Sydney	Available	at	
http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15599	(accessed	10	January	2015).	
O	 The	Hon	John	Howard	MP	(29	June	2007)	doorstop	interview	in	Narangba,	Queensland	by	
unknown	journalist.	Available	at	http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15687	
(accessed	10	January	2015).	
P	 The	Hon	John	Howard	MP address (26	June	2007)	to	a	Community	Morning	Tea,	Hervey	Bay,	
Queensland.	Available	at	http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=15340	
(accessed	10	January	2015).	
	
	
Political	actors	are	concerned	with	assembling	an	‘audience	with	a	common	horizon	of	concern’	
(Finlayson	 and	 Martin	 2008:	 529).	 Political	 speech,	 in	 particular	 that	 preceding	 a	 vote	 on	
legislative	 provisions,	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 creation	 of	 consensus,	 often	 through	 the	 use	 of	
‘intrinsically	persuasive’	 images	 (Finlayson	and	Martin	2008:	450).	Krebs	and	 Jackson	 (2007)	
have	argued	that	social	scientists	should	not	begin	by	specifying	the	interests	of	actors	in	order	
to	prevent	their	analysis	being	driven	by	this	agenda.	However,	for	the	purposes	of	this	article,	it	
is	accepted	that	the	Ministers	sought	support	for	their	proposed	legislative	provisions.	Wilson	
(2001:	410)	 suggested	 ‘one	 of	 the	 core	 goals	 of	 political	 discourse	 analysis	 is	 to	 seek	out	 the	
ways	in	which	language	choice	is	manipulated	for	specific	political	effect’.	
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This	 article	 addresses	 the	 lack	 of	 scholarship	 surrounding	 the	 process	 of	 consensus‐making,	
including	 the	 process	 of	 communication	 and	 argumentation	 in	 pre‐legislative	 speech	 acts	 to	
facilitate	 the	 passage	 of	 contentious	 legislation,	 in	 this	 case	 the	Northern	 Territory	 National	
Emergency	 Response	 Act	 2007	 (Cth)	 and	 associated	 acts	 comprising	 the	 Intervention.	 The	
selection	of	the	paradigm	allows	for	the	bridging	of	social	sciences	and	law.	This	RPA	paradigm	
allows	for	the	pre‐legislative	speech	to	be	understood	as	seeking	a	consensus	in	order	to	pass	a	
vote	 to	 enact	 the	 legislation.	 The	 paradigm	 values	 the	 use	 of	 rhetoric	 in	 pre‐legislative	
consensus	 creation.	 The	 insights	 gained	 from	 this	 mode	 of	 analysis	 can	 be	 used	 for	 further	
purposes	 of	 critique	 and	 improvement,	 and	 increasing	 legitimacy	 and	 transparency	 in	 the	
exertion	of	power	through	the	mechanism	of	law.	This	method	of	analysis	is	particularly	useful	
for	 those	 studying	 the	 enactment	 of	 law	 and	 mobilisation	 of	 support	 for	 action	 concerning	
marginalised	groups	or	communities.	
	
Methodologically,	 the	speech	acts	were	read	and	analysed	 for	 the	reasons	given	 in	support	of	
the	Intervention.	First,	a	close	textual	reading	of	the	speech	acts	occurred	and	arguments	made	
by	 the	Ministers	were	noted.	This	was	coupled	with	 research	 into	 the	external	 circumstances	
and	 broader	 socio‐political	 context	 of	 the	 speech	 acts.	 Second,	 the	 language	 choice,	
argumentation	and	reasoning	were	identified	and	then	understood	in	relation	to	the	positioning	
and	use	of	rhetorical	tropes:	 for	example,	hyperboles,	 irony,	 litotes,5	metaphors,	metonymies,6	
oxymorons	 and	 synecdoches.7	 Trope	 usage	 in	 argument	 structure	 supporting	 government	
action	was	 identified	 and	 analysed.	 Numerous	 and	 repeated	 close	 textual	 readings	 helped	 to	
identify	the	meaning	within	the	trope.	Potential	conflicting	meanings	were	noted,	and	the	tropes	
were	then	clustered	and	themes	identified.	
	
Chandler	 (2007:	 124)	 suggests	 rhetorical	 ‘tropes	 may	 be	 essential	 to	 understanding	 if	 we	
interpret	 this	as	a	process	of	rendering	the	unfamiliar	more	 familiar’.	The	Ministers	sought	 to	
ensure	 the	 general	 public	 as	well	 as	 the	 lawmakers	 understood	 the	 need	 for	 action	 and	 thus	
supported	the	Intervention.	Chandler	(2007)	noted	that	the	identification	of	figurative	tropes	in	
texts	and	practices	could	help	identify	the	thematic	framework,	which	sometimes	involves	the	
use	 of	 an	 overarching	 metaphor	 or	 dominant	 trope.	 It	 is	 argued	 here	 that	 the	 overarching	
metaphor	 and	 dominant	 trope	 was	 a	 ‘synthetic	 necessary	 truth’	 (Roffee	 2014).	 A	 synthetic	
necessary	 truth	occurs	when	actors	seek	 to	create	a	 reality	 that	portrays	 life	or	a	situation	or	
scenario	in	a	way	that	is	at	odds	with	empirical	reality,	for	a	specific	reason.	For	example,	there	
is	 an	 implicit	 need	 or	 ‘necessity’	 to	 frame	 the	 situation,	 in	 order	 to	 legitimise	 the	 federal	
government’s	 action	 and	 create	 a	 political	 consensus	 to	 tackle	 the	 problem	 in	 the	 way	
advocated.	 In	 this	 trope,	 synthetic	 indicates	 the	 falsity	 of	 the	 situation	 or	 ‘truth’	 that	 is	 being	
created	and	used	by	the	political	actors.	As	argued	elsewhere,	‘[t]his	creation	may	merely	be	the	
framing	 of	 an	 issue	 or	 situation	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 make	 the	 situation	 appear	 at	 odds	 to	
empirical	reality’	(Roffee	2014:	118).	The	analysis	indicates	that	this	trope	focused	on	the	newly	
emerged	 need	 for	 action	 to	 combat	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 and	 the	 complicity	 of	 the	 Aboriginal	
communities	 in	 its	commission.	However,	 there	was	already	support	 for	action	 to	 tackle	child	
sexual	 abuse	 in	Aboriginal	 communities	 (see	Aboriginal	Child	 Sexual	Assault	Taskforce	2006;	
Gordon,	Hallahan	and	Henry	2002;	Keel	2004;	Memmott	et	al.	2001).	The	analysis	indicates	that	
the	Ministers	failed	to	create	a	consensus	on	the	methods	or	tools	of	the	Intervention	and	used	
this	truth	to	move	the	focus	away	from	tools	and	methods	and	onto	the	seriousness	and	horrific	
nature	of	child	sexual	abuse.		
	
As	noted	above,	the	analysis	identified	three	interlinked	features	in	the	pre‐legislative	rhetorical	
argumentation.	 First	 was	 a	 failure	 to	 differentiate	 and	 clarify	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 federal	
government	 sought	 to	 use	 the	 Report.	 Second,	 the	 speech	 acts	 omitted	 to	 explain	 the	 link	
between	 controversial	 provisions	 of	 the	 Intervention	 and	 child	 sexual	 abuse.	 And	 finally,	 the	
Ministers	 failed	 to	 distinguish	 how	 this	 non‐consultative	 Intervention	was	 any	 different	 from	
previous	forms	of	oppressive	federal	and	state	intervention	into	Aboriginal	people’s	lives.	These	
three	features	will	be	addressed	below.	
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Ministers’	use	of	the	Little	Children	are	Sacred	report		
The	Ministers	 displayed	 a	 duality	 in	 their	 communications	 concerning	 their	 use	 of	 the	 Little	
Children	 are	 Sacred	 report.	 The	 analysis	 indicated	 that	 the	 Report	 was	 used	 both	 as	 a	
justification	 for	 taking	 action	 in	 Aboriginal	 communities,	 and	 as	 a	 justification	 for	 the	 action	
taken	 in	terms	of	the	specific	methods	and	tools	used	in	the	Intervention.	The	messages	in	the	
speech	acts	blurred	the	two	uses,	weakened	the	argument,	and	left	open	a	significant	avenue	for	
criticism.	 Although	 the	 Report	 and	 the	 Ministers’	 intervention	 arguably	 shared	 a	 number	 of	
similarities	 in	 their	 end	 goals,	 including	 ending	 child	 sexual	 abuse,	 they	 advocated	 different	
approaches	to	tackling	the	issue.	
	
In	the	development	of	a	synthetic	necessary	truth,	the	Ministers	constructed	a	reality	centring	
on	 the	 use	 of	 the	 metaphor	 of	 ‘emergency’.	 The	 emotive	 moral	 capital	 associated	 with	
vulnerable	children	amplified	 the	need	to	render	help	and	assistance.	The	Report	was	not	 the	
first	 time	 that	 political	 attention	 had	 been	 drawn	 to	 suffering	 in	 Aboriginal	 communities.	
Indeed,	 as	 Cripps	 (2007:	 9)	 suggested,	 there	 had	 been	 a	 ‘plethora	 of	 federal	 and	 state	
government‐commissioned	reports	on	the	problem’	of	Indigenous	family	violence	in	the	decade	
leading	 up	 to	 the	 Intervention.	 However,	 the	 immediacy	 of	 this	 emergency,	 which	 has	 been	
criticised	by	a	number	of	academics	(see,	amongst	others,	Behrendt	2007;	Maddison	2008),	 is	
apparent	throughout	the	speeches:	
	
What	we	 can	only	describe	as	 a	national	 emergency	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 abuse	of	
children	in	indigenous	[sic]	communities.	(Howard	and	Brough:	Speech	Act	H)	
This	 is	 an	 emergency	 situation	 in	 the	 Northern	 Territory	 and	 we	 need	 to	 act	
quickly.	(Brough:	Speech	Act	G)	
Well,	look,	the	whole	conditions,	Kerry,	are	a	national	emergency.	We’ve	elevated	
it	to	that.	(Brough:	Speech	Act	D)	
	
One	of	 the	authors	of	 the	Report	suggested,	 ‘no	one	needed	an	 inquiry	 to	 tell	 them	that	 these	
measures	were	needed’	(Anderson	2011:	26)	and:		
	
Where	was	 the	 evidence‐base	 for	 this	 radical	 re‐shaping	 of	 policy	…	 Simply:	 it	
was	absent.	There	was	no	attempt	to	justify	the	policy	by	reference	to	evidence.	
There	was	no	attempt	to	address	that	the	vast	majority	of	the	evidence	pointed	in	
exactly	 the	 opposite	 direction	 to	where	 the	 policy	was	 going.	 (Anderson	 2011:	
27)	
	
The	then	Prime	Minister	likened	the	escalating	abuse	in	Aboriginal	communities	to	the	natural	
disaster	that	devastated	New	Orleans	in	2005,	Hurricane	Katrina.	
	
We	should	have	been	more	humble.	We	have	our	Katrina,	here	and	now.	That	it	
has	unfolded	more	slowly	and	absent	the	hand	of	God	should	make	us	humbler	
still.	(Howard	and	Brough:	Speech	Act	H)	
	
The	 US	 federal	 response	 to	 Hurricane	 Katrina	 drew	 intense	 criticism,	 centring	 on	
mismanagement	and	lack	of	leadership	in	the	relief	efforts.	The	criticism	levelled	at	the	federal	
administration	 also	 suggested	 that	 race	 and	 class	 were	 factors	 affecting	 the	 response	 to	 the	
natural	 disaster	 (Adams,	 O’Brien	 and	 Nelson	 2006).	 It	 is	 therefore	 surprising	 that	 Prime	
Minister	Howard	used	such	a	weak	metaphor	to	frame	the	situation	in	the	Northern	Territory.	It	
appears	 that	 the	 Howard	 government	may	 have	 intended	 to	 use	 the	metaphor	 of	 Katrina	 to	
allow	for	a	positive	comparison	between	their	intended	fast	response	in	the	Northern	Territory	
and	 that	 of	 the	 US	 federal	 administration.	 They	 may	 also	 have	 had	 the	 expectation	 that	
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allegations	of	racism	would	occur	regardless	of	their	response.	Their	emphasis	was	not	on	the	
natural	 occurrence	of	 the	disaster	 in	 the	Northern	Territory	 but	on	 the	necessity	of	 a	 federal	
response.	 It	 is	 likely	 that,	 rather	 than	 the	 emergency,	 defined	 as	 an	 unforeseen	 or	 sudden	
occurrence,	the	Prime	Minister	wanted	the	idea	of	state	of	emergency	to	resonate	in	the	public	
mind.	 It	 is	 this	 condition	 or	 state	 of	 being,	 as	 declared	 by	 the	 federal	 government,	 that	 was	
created	by	the	framing	of	the	situation	in	the	Northern	Territory.	The	existence	of	this	condition	
allowed	for	an	urgent	and	unprecedented	governmental	response,	and	was	used	to	support	the	
action	 taken.	 This	 newly	 emerged	 need	 for	 action	 to	 combat	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 was	 the	
overarching	metaphor	and	dominant	trope	found	within	the	speech	acts.	
	
The	speech	acts	also	 indicated	a	belief	 that	 the	situation	was	more	serious	and	severe	 than	 it	
had	 ever	 been.	 The	 Ministers	 overstated	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 Report,	 which	 stated,	 ‘it	 is	 not	
possible	 to	 accurately	 estimate	 the	 extent	 of	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 in	 the	 Northern	 Territory’s	
Aboriginal	communities’	(2007:	57).	They	reported:	
	
That	the	inquiry	finds	child	abuse	occurring	in	every	Indigenous	community	and	
that	 there	 are	 sex	 trades	 and	 juvenile	 prostitution	 occurring	 is	 something	 that	
should	sicken	all	Australians.	(Brough:	Speech	Act	A)	
	
In	 reality,	 as	many	 reports	 on	 Aboriginal	 communities	 had	 indicated,	 the	 situation	 gradually	
developed	 as	 the	 communities	 in	 question	 slowly	 deteriorated.	 Indeed	 contrary	 to	 their	
emergency	metaphor,	the	Ministers	acknowledged	the	issue	was	not	new:	
	
Mal,	 from	 the	 moment	 he	 took	 over	 this	 job,	 identified	 this	 as	 a	 problem.	
(Howard:	Speech	Act	I)	
	
The	Prime	Minister’s	 response	 to	 the	question	 ‘Why	did	 it	 take	 this	report	 to	convince	you	 to	
intervene	 so	 dramatically?’	 (Howard:	 Speech	 Act	 I),	 nonetheless	 indicates	 that	 the	 Report	
convinced	the	Ministers	of	the	need	to	take	action:	
	
This	report	was	so	graphic	and	the	authority	brought	to	it	by	the	two	authors	was	
so	compelling.	(Howard:	Speech	Act	I)	
	
Thus	the	Report,	in	Hemming’s	terms,	‘provided	the	catalyst	for	federal	intervention’	(Hemming	
2010:	438).	However,	 in	other	high	profile	speeches	including	the	media	release	on	the	day	of	
the	 Intervention	announcement,	 the	Report	was	 also	used	 to	 justify	 the	 specific	methods	and	
actions	 taken.	 Initial	 speeches	 and	 public	 briefings	 suggested	 that	 the	 Intervention	 was	
following	the	recommendations	of	the	Report:	
	
The	immediate	nature	of	the	Australian	Government’s	response	reflects	the	very	
first	 recommendation	 of	 the	 Little	 Children	 are	 Sacred	 report.	 (Brough:	 Speech	
Act	B)	
	
The	 speech	 acts	 presented	 the	 impression	 that,	 through	 taking	 action,	 the	 Ministers	 were	
complying	with	the	Report’s	recommendations.	However	this	was	not	the	case.	For	example,	the	
Report	 reiterated	 the	 need	 for	 ‘a	 collaborative	 partnership’	 (Wild	 and	 Anderson	 2007:	 22)	
between	the	national	and	regional	governments	and	Aboriginal	communities,	and	for	 ‘genuine	
consultation	with	Aboriginal	people	 in	designing	 initiatives	 for	Aboriginal	communities’	 (Wild	
and	Anderson	2007:	7).	It	did	not	recommend	the	government	to	impose	a	top‐down	solution.	
In	fact,	it	recommended	‘for	there	to	be	consultation	with,	and	ownership	by	the	communities,	
of	those	solutions.	The	underlying	dysfunctionality	where	child	sexual	abuse	flourishes	needs	to	
be	 attacked,	 and	 the	 strength	 returned	 to	 Aboriginal	 people’	 (Wild	 and	 Anderson	 2007:	 22).	
This	 did	 not	 occur.	 There	was	 no	 consultation	with	 the	 Aboriginal	 peoples	 to	 be	 affected,	 or	
provision	made	for	their	participation	in	the	decision‐making	and	formation	of	the	details	of	the	
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Intervention.	 Significantly,	 this	 is	 at	odds	with	 the	 recommendations	of	 the	Report,	 and	 Irene	
Watson	 (2009)	 noted	 the	 federal	 government	 ignored	 most	 of	 the	 97	 recommendations.	
Brough’s	attempt	to	justify	the	Intervention	by	reference	to	the	recommendations	of	the	Report	
failed	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 the	 recommendations	 advocated	 an	 approach	 that	 was	 at	 the	
opposite	end	of	the	spectrum	to	that	his	government	sought	to	take.	
	
The	analysis	indicates	that	Ministers’	discourse	in	the	speech	acts	suggests	the	Intervention	was	
an	example	of	evidence‐triggered	policy	(see	Young	et	al.	2002)	and	not	an	example	of	evidence‐
based	 policy‐making,	 as	 Maddison	 (2012)	 has	 argued.	 Within	 the	 speech	 acts,	 the	 Ministers	
blurred	 their	use	of	 the	Report	 as	 a	 trigger	 for	 action	and	a	 justification	 for	 the	 action	 taken,	
using	the	opportunity	to	present	the	situation	as	an	emergency	in	order	to	facilitate	the	passage	
of	 legislation	 that	 they	 argued	 would	 tackle	 the	 child	 sexual	 abuse	 in	 remote	 Aboriginal	
communities.	Unfortunately,	 the	wide‐ranging	provisions	appeared	to	have	 few	direct	 links	to	
combating	 child	 sexual	 abuse.	 On	 being	 questioned	 about	 this,	 the	 speech	 acts	 indicate	 an	
unwillingness	to	respond	and	this,	combined	with	their	use	of	rhetorical	tropes,	does	nothing	to	
disprove	 or	 dampen	 the	 claims	 that	 the	 Intervention	was	merely	 another	 attempt	 to	morally	
manage	the	Aboriginal	population.	
	
Explanation	of	linkages	between	provisions	and	combating	child	sexual	abuse	
The	Report	advocated	a	holistic	response	to	the	issues	faced	in	the	Northern	Territory.	It	stated	
‘the	underlying	dysfunctionality	where	child	sexual	abuse	flourishes	needs	to	be	attacked’	(Wild	
and	 Anderson	 2007:	 21).	 It	 provided	 recommendations	 in	 relation	 to	 health,	 family	 support,	
education,	alcohol,	community	awareness,	employment	housing,	pornography	and	gambling.	As	
seen	 above,	 the	 legislative	 provisions	 impacted	 and	 changed	 these	policy	 areas.	However	 the	
method	of	execution	of	 the	changes	was	not	 in	accordance	with	 the	recommendations	and,	 to	
this	 end,	 the	 Ministers’	 speech	 acts	 did	 nothing	 to	 differentiate	 their	 approach	 from	 that	
advocated	in	the	Report.	Some	have	thus	suggested	that	 ‘it	is	hard	to	understand	how	some	of	
these	 interventions,	such	as	scrapping	 the	permit	system,	will	help	reduce	child	sexual	abuse’	
(Hunter	2008:	381,	see	also	Brown	and	Brown	2007).		
	
The	inclusion	of	wide‐ranging	and	controversial	provisions	in	the	Intervention,	coupled	with	the	
failure	 to	 detail	 the	 interlinked	 nature	 of	 those	 provisions	 to	 structural	 change,	 was	
undoubtedly	problematic	 in	the	creation	of	a	consensus.	The	speeches	implicitly	endorsed	the	
complex	 range	 of	 legislation	 and	 tools	 needed	 to	 tackle	 the	 long‐standing	 issues	 of	 abuse.	 A	
number	of	 the	 speeches	noted	 individual	measures:	 for	example,	alcohol	 restrictions,	medical	
examination,	 welfare,	 and	 increases	 in	 policing	 levels.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Ministers	 failed	 to	
explicitly	state	and	explain	the	reasoning	behind	the	controversial	provisions	and	their	links	to	
ameliorating	the	situation.	
	
When	 questioned	 on	 the	 methods	 and	 details	 of	 the	 Intervention,	 the	 Ministers	 used	 highly	
effective	 rhetorical	 tropes	 to	 close	down	 the	 line	of	 questioning,	 avoiding	 a	 response	 and	 the	
need	 to	 explain	 the	 action	 taken.	 For	 example,	 on	 being	 questioned	 on	 ABC	 TV’s	 national	
flagship	current	affairs	program	(Brough:	Speech	Act	D)	about	the	detail	behind	the	mandatory	
medical	check‐ups	of	Aboriginal	children,	Brough	used	enantiosis	in	order	to	avoid	responding:		
	
BROUGH:	 Well,	 Kerry,	 it's	 very	 interesting	 how	 we	 are	 having	 this	 discussion	
because,	let's	turn	it	around.	Let's	do	nothing.	
INTERVIEWER:	Mr	Brough,	that's	not	...	
BROUGH:	No,	Kerry.	No,	Kerry.	
INTERVIEWER:	With	all	due	respect,	let	me	make	this	point	to	you,	there	is	broad	
acceptance	 of	 a	 serious	 need	 for	 action	 to	 be	 taken.	We	 are	 now	 going	 to	 the	
detail	of	how	you	are	going	to	responsibly	implement	a	very	radical	plan	that	was	
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announced	at	short	notice.	You	are	still	 clearly	working	out	 the	details.	 I	would	
suggest	 to	 you	 that	 these	 questions	 are	 both	 relevant	 and	 responsible	 and	
deserve	to	be	answered	...	
BROUGH:	Well,	Kerry,	you've	got	 it	entirely	wrong.	What	we	are	doing	 today	 is	
securing	the	environment	and	making	an	assessment.	When	we	have	done	that,	
then	we	will	move	to	the	issue	of	health	checks.	
	
Such	 use	 of	 enantiosis	 by	 the	 Minister	 failed	 to	 convey	 sincerity	 and	 indicated	 a	 defensive	
attitude.	 In	 light	of	 the	 traditional	owners’	 longstanding	dispossession	of	Aboriginal	 land,	 it	 is	
understandable	 that	 questions	 would	 arise	 relating	 to	 the	 measures	 seeking	 to	 alter	 land	
ownership	and	occupation.	Alterations	to	the	permit	system	of	entry	onto	Aboriginal	land	were	
tabled	well	before	the	Intervention,	occurring	in	the	Aboriginal	Land	Rights	(Northern	Territory)	
Amendment	 Act	 2006	 (Cth).	 The	 explanatory	 memorandum	 of	 this	 Act	 openly	 stated	 ‘the	
principal	 objectives	 of	 this	 Bill	 are	 to	 improve	 access	 to	 Aboriginal	 land	 for	 development,	
especially	mining.’	Any	attempt	to	question	the	specific	details	of	the	Bills	and	provisions	led	to	
responses	 that	 referred	 to	 the	extent	and	severity	of	 the	devastation	within	 the	communities.	
Reliance	upon	 the	 synthetic	necessary	 truth	of	 the	newly	 emerged	 emergency	 of	 child	 sexual	
abuse	 and	 complicity	 of	 Aboriginal	 communities	 again	 allowed	 the	 argument	 to	 divert	 from	
critique	of	the	methods	and	mode	of	the	Intervention,	instead	focusing	on	the	horrific	nature	of	
the	abuse.	
	
General	statements	about	societal	degradation	in	Aboriginal	communities,	although	supportive	
of	 the	 need	 to	 intervene,	 failed	 to	 ameliorate	 the	 lack	 of	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	 highly	
controversial	 legislative	 provisions	 sought	 to	 alter	 the	 situation.	 Instead,	 they	 posed	 a	 very	
serious	secondary	problem,	that	of	stigmatisation	of	an	already	marginalised	community:	
	
What	we	have	got	to	do	is	confront	the	fact	that	these	communities	have	broken	
down.	The	basic	elements	of	a	civilised	society	don’t	exist.	(Howard:	Speech	Act	J)	
	
Such	 indictments	 of	 entire	 communities	 both	 rely	 upon	 and	 support	 the	 synthetic	 necessary	
truth.	 The	 speech	 acts	 presented	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 emergency	 situation	 as	being	 greater	 than	
that	 outlined	within	 the	Report	 and	 displayed	 a	 lack	 of	 sufficient	 qualifiers	 or	 explanation	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 abuse	 within	 the	 remote	 Aboriginal	 communities.	 Any	 such	
qualification	often	came	after	a	damning	censure	of	the	Aboriginal	community	as	a	whole:	
	
We	have	been	presented	with	the	most	compelling	evidence	of	total	 failure	in	a	
society.	(Howard:	Speech	Act	I)	
	
This	was	followed	by:	
	
I'm	not	 saying	 it	 hasn't	 happened	 in	 other	 communities	 and	 I'm	not	 saying	 it's	
only	in	Indigenous	communities	that	this	sort	of	things	happens.	I	know	enough	
of	life	to	recognise	that's	not	the	case.	But	these	are	the	most	egregious	examples,	
the	most	squalored	concentration	you	can	find	in	our	community	of	these	sorts	of	
things.	(Howard:	Speech	Act	I)	
	
Issues	concerning	child	sexual	abuse	are	morally	axiomatic.	The	improvement	of	children’s	lives	
and	 protection	 of	 childhood	 innocence	 is	 guaranteed	 to	 rally	 public	 support.	 It	 is	 therefore	
possible	that	the	Ministers	sought	to	rely	upon	the	pre‐existing	beliefs	of	the	audience,	including	
any	racist	beliefs	about	the	conduct	and	behaviour	of	Aboriginal	people,	in	order	to	gain	support	
for	 the	 federal	 government	 Intervention.	 Ministers	 sought	 to	 garner	 support	 using	 an	
overemphasis	on	the	failure	of	the	collective	community	in	relation	to	the	child	abuse:		
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This	social	malaise	cannot	and	should	not	be	seen	as	just	a	failure	of	government.	
The	primary	responsibility	for	the	care	and	upbringing	of	children	must	rest	with	
parents	 and	we	 should	be	honest	 and	mature	 enough	 as	 a	 society	 to	 recognise	
this	fact.	(Howard:	Speech	Act	K:	70)	
	
The	speech	acts	intimated	that	the	community	could	have	tackled	the	problem	but	was	unable	
to	act	without	help.	Implied	within	the	speech	acts	was	the	suggestion	that	the	Ministers	were	
willing	to	take	the	brave	steps	to	remedy	the	situation,	where	others	had	ignored	the	situation	
or	faltered.	There	was	no	apology	for	any	failure	by	the	incumbent	or	other	federal	and	territory	
governments,	for	inaction	in	the	face	of	the	growing	number	of	reports	of	child	sexual	abuse.	It	
was	implicit	within	the	speech	acts	that	failure	of	the	collective	community	to	respond	allowed	
for	 the	Ministers	 to	 override	 any	 recommendations	 of	 the	 Report	 in	 relation	 to	 consultation,	
empowerment	and	culturally	appropriate	responses.	
	
It	may	be	that	the	Ministers	thought	that	statements	surrounding	the	horrific	nature	and	extent	
of	 the	 abuse	 would	 provide	 them	 with	 the	 support	 to	 impose	 significant	 and	 wide‐ranging	
provisions	 and	 thus	 allow	 them	 to	 avoid	 explaining	 the	 details	 of	 the	 hastily‐drafted	 and	
complex	 legislative	bills.	Even	so,	 it	was	easily	 foreseeable	 that	 taking	action	at	odds	with	the	
recommendations	of	the	Report	would	lead	to	claims	of	racism	and	paternalism.	This	likelihood	
was	amplified	by	the	practically	unexplained	suspension	of	 the	Racial	Discrimination	Act	1975	
(Cth).	 The	 scant	 explanation	 of	 the	 linkages	 between	 the	 measures	 of	 the	 Intervention	 and	
intended	 outcomes	 was	 a	 shortcoming	 in	 the	 speech	 acts.	 In	 particular,	 there	 was	 need	 to	
explain	why	 the	Report	was	not	being	 followed.	However	 this	omission	 served	 the	Ministers’	
purposes	and	facilitated	the	passage	of	the	Acts.	The	most	glaring	absence	is	 in	relation	to	the	
issue	of	agency	and	Aboriginal	peoples,	especially	the	failure	to	follow	the	first	recommendation	
of	 the	Report	which	 included	that	both	 federal	and	territory	governments	 ‘commit	 to	genuine	
consultation	with	Aboriginal	people	 in	designing	 initiatives	 for	Aboriginal	communities’	 (Wild	
and	Anderson	2007:	22).	This	issue	will	be	addressed	below.	
	
Ministers	absence	of	recognition	of	agency	and	need	for	consultation		
One	of	the	enduring	legacies	of	the	top‐down	approach	taken	by	numerous	federal	and	territory	
governments	has	been	 the	 removal	of	agency	and	ability	of	Aboriginal	peoples	 to	 shape	 their	
futures.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 recommendations	of	 the	Report,	which	 recognised	 the	 importance	of	
Aboriginal	participation,	Howard	and	Brough	found	it	expedient	to	act	on	behalf	of,	rather	than	
in	partnership	with,	Aboriginal	communities.	As	seen	above,	these	communities	were	portrayed	
within	the	speech	acts	as	being	complicit	 in	 the	abuse.	The	Prime	Minister	used	hypophora,	a	
figure	of	speech	where	the	speaker	poses	and	answers	a	question,	in	the	initial	press	conference	
announcing	the	Intervention,	to	imply	complicity:	
	
What	would	happen	if	the	same	circumstances	occurred	in	an	outer	metropolitan	
suburb?	 It	would	have	been	horror	and	 immediate	action	and	a	demand	by	 the	
community	 that	 something	 be	 done.	 That	 has	 not	 happened	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
Northern	Territory.	(Howard	and	Brough:	Speech	Act	H)	
	
These	tropes	indict	both	the	community	and	Northern	Territory	Government	for	its	inaction:		
	
The	 report	 was	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 Northern	 Territory	 Government	 for	 some	
eight	 weeks	 before	 it	 was	 released	 and	 subsequently	 the	 Chief	 Minister	 has	
indicated	that	they	would	have	a	response	in	a	period	of	six	weeks.	(Howard	and	
Brough:	Speech	Act	H)	
	
The	framing	of	the	situation	as	an	extensive	national	emergency	in	which	the	communities	were	
complicit	 allowed	 the	 Ministers	 to	 implicitly	 dismiss	 participation	 of	 the	 Aboriginal	
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communities	 and	 Northern	 Territory	 Government	 in	 the	 decision‐making	 process.	 This	 is	
particularly	problematic	 in	relation	 to	the	historical	 injustices	against	Aboriginal	peoples.	 It	 is	
contrary	to	the	recommendations	in	the	Report	that	recognised	the	importance	of	empowering	
Aboriginal	communities	 to	work	with	 the	State	 in	crafting	solutions	to	problems	within	them.	
Although	 presenting	 as	 if	 following	 the	 recommendations,	 Brough	 dismissed	 the	 need	 for	
further	consultation:	
	
We	 need	 strong	 powers	 so	 that	we	 are	 not	weighed	 down	by	 unnecessary	 red	
tape	 and	 talk	 fests,	 and	 can	 focus	 on	 doing	 what	 needs	 to	 be	 done.	 (Brough:	
Speech	Act	G:	18)	
	
The	 audience	 faces	 a	 binary	 proposition:	 action	 or	 inaction.	 The	 suggestion	 is	 that	 the	
consultation	and	 cooperation	with	 the	community	 in	 a	 ‘talk	 fest’	would	 result	 in	 inaction	and	
delay	 any	 response.	 Inaction	was	 presented	 as	 a	 corollary	 to	 consultation	 and,	 along	with	 it,	
more	lives	ruined.	Contextualised,	this	communicated	and	reinforced	to	the	audience	that	both	
ignoring	the	wishes	of	the	local	community	and	the	failure	to	consult	was	for	the	benefit	of	the	
children.	It	is,	therefore,	easy	to	understand	how	some	academics	including	Brown	and	Brown	
(2007:	622)	have	argued	that	the	public	debate	has	been	put	in	the	terms	‘you	are	either	with	us	
or	against	us’.	
	
Brough’s	narrative	within	the	speech	acts	relied	heavily	on	the	urgency	of	ending	child	sexual	
abuse.	 Lack	 of	 action	 or	 any	 delay	 in	 acting,	 including	 by	 implication	 normal	 legislative	
procedure	and	consultation,	was	presented	as	 further	 tacitly	 sanctioning	 the	abuse.	Pritchard	
(2007)	noted	that	the	federal	government	introduced	the	Bills	in	the	House	of	Representatives	
less	 than	 24	 hours	 after	 first	 providing	 drafts	 of	 the	 proposed	 legislation	 to	 the	 opposition	
parties	 and	 relevant	 stakeholders,	 including	peak	 Indigenous	bodies.	The	 legislation	 ‘totalling	
over	 500	 pages,	 were	 rammed	 through	 parliament	 in	 a	 week	 with	 scrutiny	 by	 the	 Senate	
Committee	 that	 was	 convened	 for	 just	 one	 day	 (and	which	 received	 154	 submissions	 in	 the	
available	48	hours)’	(Altman	2007:	8).	Regardless	of	the	horrific	nature	of	the	abuse,	the	time	or	
lack	 thereof,	 for	 external	 input	 was	 concerning	 in	 light	 of	 the	 longstanding	 mistreatment	 of	
Aboriginal	 people	 in	 decision‐making.8	 There	 was,	 thus,	 a	 failure	 to	 distinguish	 how	 this	
situation	 leading	 to	 the	 Intervention	was	different	 to	cases	of	 child	abuse	reported	elsewhere	
and	 previous	 paternalistic	 state	 behaviour	 towards	 Aboriginal	 Australians	 in	 remote	
communities.9	
	
The	speech	acts	also	demonstrated	a	resolute	attitude	that	could	understandably	be	interpreted	
by	some	as	neo‐colonial	and	imperious.	In	a	doorstep	interview,	the	Prime	Minister	responded	
to	the	calls	for	greater	consultation:	
	
My	reply	to	that	is	that	my	Government	has	never	stopped	talking	to	Indigenous	
people,	 but	 what	 has	 to	 be	 understood	 now	 is	 that	 the	 old	 approach	 has	 not	
worked	and	if	we	are	to	save	a	generation	of	Indigenous	children	from	the	most	
appalling	abuse	we	must	 intervene	 in	 the	way	 that	 I	have	outlined	and	we	will	
maintain	our	position	very	strongly.	(Howard:	Speech	Act	M)	
	
The	response	from	the	Prime	Minister	was	not	that	the	government	would	listen.	It	was	that	the	
old	 approach,	 listening	 to	 Aboriginal	 people	 and	 their	 needs,	 did	 not	 work.	 Analysis	 of	 the	
speech	acts	indicated	a	failure	to	distinguish	why	the	Intervention	should	occur	in	the	form	of	a	
non‐consultative	 imposition.	 It	 also	 shows	 that	 the	 speech	 acts	 were	 void	 of	 any	
acknowledgment	 or	 understanding	 of	 nature	 and	 treatment	 of	 ‘race,	 state	 intervention	 and	
spatial	governance’	(Howard‐Wagner	2010a:	219).	It	is	concerning	that	the	federal	government	
did	 not	 engage	 in	 consultative	 dialogue	 and	 partnership	with	 Aboriginal	 peoples	 but	 instead	
presented	itself	as	a	heroic	saviour:	
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I	have	likened	this	to	the	action	we	should	take	when	a	community	is	struck	by	a	
cyclone	or	a	flood.	Certain	things	have	to	be	put	aside.	Certain	normalities	have	to	
be	discarded.	 You	have	 to	move	boldly	 and	 you	 have	 to	 do	 it	 quickly.	 (Brough:	
Speech	Act	C:	76)	
	
The	 state	 of	 emergency	was	used	 to	 implicitly	 justify	 overriding	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	
Report	 that	 spoke	 directly	 to	 the	 need	 for	 consultation	 and	 empowerment	 of	 the	 local	
communities.	The	attempts	to	distinguish	how	the	Intervention	differed	from	previous	federal	
responses	 to	Aboriginal	 communities	 and	 diversionary	 responses	were	unconvincing	 and	did	
nothing	to	positively	strengthen	the	argument	for	the	Intervention.	
	
Concluding	comments	
While	the	Ministers	may	not	have	been	concerned	about	the	quality	of	their	argumentation	and	
chose	to	focus	only	on	the	outcome,	the	real	success	within	the	pre‐legislative	discourse	was	the	
creation	 and	 use	 of	 a	 synthetic	 necessary	 truth.	 Fundamentally,	 the	 outcome	 was	 another	
instance	 of	 a	 top‐down	 policy	 imposition	 onto	 Aboriginal	 communities	 that	 faced	 little	
resistance.	 Along	 with	 a	 number	 of	 rhetorical	 tropes,	 a	 synthetic	 necessary	 truth	 was	
successfully	 used	 to	 deny	 any	opponents	 to	 the	 Intervention	 a	 sustainable	 rebuttal.	 In	 fact,	 it	
helped	to	secure	the	overwhelming	support	of	the	opposition	Australian	Labor	Party,	something	
notoriously	 difficult	 for	 the	 conservative	 Howard‐led	 Liberal‐National	 Party	 Coalition	
Government	to	do.	
	
Australia’s	neglect	of	its	remote	Aboriginal	communities	has	led	to	longstanding	degradation	in	
some	communities	to	the	point	where	child	sexual	abuse	became	commonplace	in	some	alcohol	
and	drug‐filled	communities.	However,	the	speech	acts	communicated	a	different	message.	They	
highlighted	 an	 extensive	 unfolding	 national	 emergency	 within	 all	 remote	 Aboriginal	
communities.	 It	 communicated	 that	 these	 communities	 imperilled	 childhood	 innocence	 and	
facilitated	sexual	abuse	of	Aboriginal	children,	and	that	the	parents,	localised	communities,	and	
Northern	Territory	Government	 bore	 responsibility	 for	 these	 endemic	 failures.	 The	Ministers	
thus	created	a	situation	where	their	response	appeared	to	be	the	only	plausible	approach.	
	
The	Report	was	 a	 catalyst	 for	 action	but	 the	Ministers	 failed	 to	 differentiate	 and	 justify	 their	
approach	 to	 the	 Intervention,	 which	 did	 not	 align	 with	 the	 Report’s	 recommendations.	 It	
appears	that	the	Ministers	never	intended	to	use	the	Report	as	a	blueprint	for	the	Intervention.	
However,	their	framing	of	the	Intervention	as	a	response	to	the	findings	of	the	Report,	and	as	a	
justification	for	the	specific	methods,	meant	that	this	Report	became	the	parameters	of	review	
and	thus	a	basis	for	criticism	from	academics,	commentators	and	the	general	public.	
	
The	 speech	 acts	 contained	 a	 lack	 of	 explanation	 and	 detail	 of	 the	 methods	 and	 tools	 of	 the	
Intervention.	The	clarification	of	 the	 links	between	the	extensive	and	controversial	provisions	
and	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	 community,	 and	 thus	 links	 to	 child	 sexual	 abuse,	 were	 sparse.	
Ministers	referred	to	the	extent	and	pervasive	nature	of	the	abuse	in	the	hope	that	the	recipient	
would	believe	that	a	complex	set	of	measures	was	required	to	tackle	the	problem.	
	
With	 the	 existence	 of	 consensus	 on	 the	 need	 to	 act,	 the	Ministers’	 foci	 should	 have	 been	 on	
developing	 consensus	 on	 the	 methods	 of	 the	 Intervention.	 Instead,	 they	 focused	 on	
communicating	 the	 emergency	 nature	 of	 the	 situation.	 The	 research	 indicates	 that,	 while	 it	
appears	 that	 the	 use	 of	 the	 rhetorical	 trope	 and	 creation	 of	 a	 synthetic	 necessary	 truth	was	
factually	unnecessary,	the	use	of	the	trope	was	functional	in	that	it	diverted	attention	away	from	
the	 detail	 of	 the	 Intervention	 and	 onto	 the	 horrific	 nature	 of	 the	 abuse.	 This	 allowed	 for	 the	
presentation	 of	 the	 binary	 positions	 of	 pro‐	 or	 anti‐change,	 which	 was	 deliberately	 used	 to	
silence	 any	 opposition.	 This	 in	 turn	 supported	 the	 federal	 government’s	 requirement	 for	 the	
Northern	Territory	Government	and	communities	of	Aboriginal	peoples	to	fall	into	line	with	the	
James	A	Roffee:	Rhetoric,	Aboriginal	Australians	and	the	Northern	Territory	Intervention	
	
IJCJ&SD						144	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2016	5(1)	
conditions	to	be	imposed	on	them.	The	result	is	a	response	that	was	similar	to	previous	eras	of	
heavy‐handed	 and	 damaging	 top‐down	 imposition.	 The	 speech	 acts	 indicate	 a	 far	 more	
thoughtful	and	strategic	approach	to	argument	formation	than	has	been	credited.	
	
The	focus	on	argumentation	allowed	the	analysis	to	pay	attention	to	the	structure	and	quality	of	
the	 arguments	 used	 by	 Ministers	 as	 they	 justified	 and	 communicated	 their	 support	 of	 the	
Intervention.	The	findings	of	the	analysis	can	be	used	by	Ministers	and	policy	makers	in	order	to	
strengthen	 argumentation,	 and	 by	 opponents	 to	 challenge	 and	 counter	 strong	 rhetorical	
narratives	 that	 were	 so	 effective	 in	 facilitating	 policy	 change.	 Although	 the	 rhetorical	 tactics	
succeeded	 in	denying	 the	 opposition	 a	 socially	 sustainable	 rebuttal,	 the	 rhetorical	 tropes	 and	
synthetic	 necessary	 truth	 both	 muddled	 and	 muffled	 the	 messages	 the	 actors	 sought	 to	
communicate	 rather	 than	 forging	 a	 true	 consensus.	 Ultimately	 however,	 the	 result	 of	 the	
discourse	was	highly	successful:	it	secured	the	Ministers	the	virtually	unhindered	enactment	of	
contentious	legislation,	enabling	their	Intervention.		
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1	The	terms	Aboriginal	and	Indigenous	are	used	here	to	specially	refer	to	Aboriginal	and	Indigenous	peoples	residing	
in	Australia.	The	capitalisation	of	these	words	is	consistent	with	the	Australian	Commonwealth	usage	of	the	terms	
and	indicates	respect	to	those	referenced;	see,	generally,	NSW	Department	of	Health	(2004).	
2	The package of legislative measures includes the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth); Social 
Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Act 2007 (Cth); Families, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern Territory Emergency Response and Other Measures) Act 
2007 (Cth); Appropriation (Northern Territory National Emergency Response) Act (No 1) 2007-08 (Cth); Appropriation 
(Northern Territory National Emergency Response) Act (No 2) 2007-08 (Cth).	
3	The	term	‘speech	act’	is	used	here	to	refer	to	a	communication	or	utterance,	which	in	this	context	is	considered	as	an	
action	paying	particular	attention	to	its	intention,	purpose	or	effect.		
4	Whilst	public	interviews	are	not	listed	in	s15AB(2)	of	the	Acts	Interpretation	Act	1901	(Cth)	as	extrinsic	aids	which	
may	assist	with	legislative	interpretation	of	an	Act,	parliamentary	debates	on	the	bill	(Hansard),	and	in	particular	
the	Second	Reading	Speeches	of	both	the	House	of	Representative	and	the	Senate	are	listed.	
5	Litotes	is	a	figure	of	speech	using	an	understatement	to	emphasise	a	point.	For	example,	stating	a	negative	to	affirm	
a	positive	or	the	use	of	double	negatives.	
6	 Metonymy	 is	 a	 figure	 of	 speech	 in	 which	 a	 word	 or	 phrase	 is	 substituted	 for	 another	 with	 which	 it	 is	 closely	
associated.	
7	Similar	to	metonymy,	synecdoche	is	a	rhetorical	trope	in	which	a	term	denoting	the	whole	is	used	for	the	part	or	
part	for	the	whole;	for	example,	ten	pairs	of	hands	to	refer	to	ten	people.	
8	 For	 further	 detail	 on	 Aboriginal	 decision‐making	 see,	 Anderson	 2007;	 Sanders	 2002.	 On	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	
Aboriginal	and	Torres	Strait	Islander	Commission,	see	Pratt	and	Bennett	2004.	
9	There	is	no	shortage	of	examples	of	legislation	that	severely	impacted	Aboriginal	Australians’	lives	in	a	number	of	
ways;	for	example,	in	South	Australia,	Aboriginal	people	were	prevented	by	ss	17	and	31	of	the	Aborigines	Act	1934‐
39	(SA)	from	freely	moving	around	the	state.	They	could	be	sent	to	reserves	or	institutions	or	expelled	from	them	
by	 the	 Aborigines	 Protection	 Board.	 Aboriginal	 Australians	 were	 unable	 to	 own	 property	 under	 the	Welfare	
Ordinance	 1953‐60	 (NT)	 ss	 25‐29.	 The	 Aboriginals	 Preservation	 and	 Protection	 Act	 1939‐1946	 (Qld)	 prevented	
Aboriginal	 people	 in	Queensland	 from	handling	 their	 own	money	 including	 that	 gained	 from	 employment.	 They	
were	also	unable	to	freely	marry	under	the	same	Act	(s	19)	and	could	not	have	sexual	relations	with	non‐Aboriginal	
people	(s	29).	
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